The main focus of this paper is on the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare (NSW). In particular, given a collection of indivisible goods that needs to be allocated to a set of agents, our goal is to compute an allocation that maximizes the geometric mean of the agents' utilities. This objective has been studied since the fifties, and is known to provide a natural balance between fairness and efficiency. For additive agent utilities, Cole and Gkatzelis [1] gave the first constant factor approximation algorithm. The natural integer program for maximizing the NSW in this setting is closely related to the Fisher market model: if we relax the integrality constraint of the allocation, i.e., assume that the the goods are divisible, this program reduces to the EisenbergGale (EG) convex program, whose solutions correspond to market equilibria for the linear Fisher market. Therefore, a canonical approach for designing a NSW approximation algorithm would be to compute a fractional allocation via the EG program, and then "round" it to get an integral one. However, Cole and Gkatzelis observed that this program's integrality gap is unbounded, and they were forced to follow an unconventional approach in designing and analyzing their algorithm. This algorithm used an alternative fractional allocation, the spending-restricted (SR) equilibrium, and they had to come up with an independent upper bound of the optimal NSW in order to prove that the approximation factor is at most 2e 1/e ≈ 2.89.
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this program computes the SR equilibrium, and, quite surprisingly, we also show that the objective of this program happens to be precisely the upper bound that was used by Cole and Gkatzelis. As a result, this new integer program yields a convex program for computing the SR equilibrium and, unlike the standard program, it has an integrality gap that is bounded by 2.89. In addition to this, we provide a tight analysis of the algorithm of Cole and Gkatzelis to show that its approximation factor is 2, which also puts an upper bound of 2 on the integrality gap of the new program. Further, we prove a lower bound of e 1/e ≈ 1.44 on the integrality gap.
Apart from the results regarding the NSW problem, we also reveal interesting connections between seemingly disparate results, and we provide convex programs for computing market equilibria in generalizations of Fisher's market model. For instance, besides the EG program, there is another very different convex program for the linear Fisher market, due to Shmyrev [2] ; however, there were no known connections between these two programs. Using our convex program duality techniques (see below), we show that one can define a dual program for each of them, and the two duals are the same, up to a change of variables. Furthermore, by adding suitable constraints to Shmyrev's program, we obtain the convex program that captures the SR equilibria used by the NSW algorithm.
The spending-restricted market model generalizes Fisher's market model and has potential use beyond its NSW application. Under this model, sellers can declare an upper bound on the money they wish to earn in the market (and take back their unsold good). Therefore, the total amount of money that the buyers can spend on this seller's good is bounded. Another generalization of the linear Fisher model that we study is the utility restricted (UR) model. In this model, buyers can declare an upper bound on the amount of utility they wish to derive (and take back the unused part of their money). Thus, in the SR model, the supply of a good is a function of the prices and, in the UR model, the amount of money a buyer spends in the market is a function of the prices. In the presence of these additional constraints, we give a convex program for the second model as well, this time by generalizing the EG program. Existence of equilibria for both models follows from these convex programs. We further show that both models admit rational equilibria, i.e., prices and allocations are rational numbers if all parameters specified in the instance are rational. As a result, the ellipsoid algorithm will find a solution to the convex programs in polynomial time.
For some of the aforementioned results, we use convex program duality. For convex programs with convex objective functions and linear constraints, we show that the duals can be constructed using a set of rules almost as simple as those for linear programs. Convex programming duality is usually stated in its most general form, with convex objective functions and convex constraints, and the process of constructing their dual is quite tedious. Following an earlier version of this paper 1 , these rules have found several applications in deriving convex programs such as for Fisher markets with spending constraint utilities, transaction costs, and reserve prices, or Arrow-Debreu market with linear utilities. They have also been used in the design of algorithms, such as simplexlike algorithms for spending constraint utilities and perfect price discrimination markets, online algorithms for scheduling and welfare maximization with production costs, as well as for bounding the price of anarchy of certain games and analyzing the convergence of the tatonnement process.
